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We provide evidence of advantageous selection in the Medigap in-
surance market and analyze its sources. Conditional on controls for
Medigap prices, those with Medigap spend, on average, $4,000 less
on medical care than those without. But if we condition on health,
those with Medigap spend $2,000 more. The sources of this advan-
tageous selection include income, education, longevity expectations,
and financial planning horizons, as well as cognitive ability. Condi-
tional on all these factors, those with higher expected medical ex-
penditures are more likely to purchase Medigap. Risk preferences do
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not appear as a source of advantageous selection; cognitive ability is
particularly important.
I. Introduction
Asymmetric information is central to modern economic models of in-
surance pioneered by Arrow (1963) and Pauly (1974). The classic equi-
librium models developed by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and Wilson
(1977) assume that potential insurance buyers have one-dimensional
private information regarding their risk type. They choose from a menu
of contracts, each specifying a premium and amount of coverage, the
one best suited to their type. These models predict a positive correlation
between insurance coverage and ex post realizations of loss. The reason
is ex ante adverse selection: the “bad risks” (i.e., those relatively likely
to suffer a loss) have an incentive to buy more insurance. Allowing for
ex post moral hazard only strengthens the positive correlation between
coverage and ex post loss. This “positive correlation property” of classic
asymmetric information models forms the basis for empirical tests of
asymmetric information in several recent papers (see Chiappori and
Salanie´ 2000).
These empirical tests, reviewed further in Section II below, generate
mixed results. In some markets, such as automobile insurance (e.g.,
Chiappori and Salanie´ 2000) and long-term-care insurance (Finkelstein
and McGarry 2006), there was no statistically significant evidence of the
positive correlation property. Findings like these have fueled an emerg-
ing literature on the possibility that multidimensional private infor-
mation may lead to what has been called “advantageous selection.” On
the theoretical side, de Meza and Webb (2001) postulate that individuals
have private information about both their risk type and their risk aver-
sion.1 They argue that selection based on risk aversion is advantageous
if those who are more risk averse both buy more insurance coverage
and have lower risks. Failure to condition on risk aversion may then
mask the positive correlation between insurance coverage and ex post
risk predicted by one-dimensional models. Following de Meza and
Webb, the existing literature points to risk preferences as the primary
suspect behind advantageous selection. In general, however, any private
information could function as a source of advantageous selection if it
is positively correlated with insurance coverage and at the same time
negatively correlated with risk.
In this paper, we examine the evidence for and sources of advanta-
1 Hemenway (1990), which used the term “propitious selection,” seems to contain the
first description of this phenomenon in the economics literature.
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geous selection in the “Medigap” insurance market. The Medicare pro-
gram provides limited health insurance for U.S. senior citizens. A Medi-
gap policy is health insurance sold by a private insurer to fill “gaps” in
coverage of the basic Medicare plan (e.g. co-pays, prescription drugs).2
The Medigap market is ideal for studying multidimensional private in-
formation and advantageous selection because of two key features.
First, since 1992, the coverage and pricing of Medigap policies have
been highly regulated by the U.S. government. Specifically, in all but
three states, insurance companies can sell only 10 standardized Medigap
policies; moreover, within the 6-month Medigap open-enrollment pe-
riod—which starts when an individual both is older than 65 and is
enrolled in Medicare Part B—an insurer cannot deny Medigap coverage,
place conditions on a policy, or charge more for pre-existing health
conditions. As shown in the theoretical analysis of Chiappori et al.
(2006), in order for multidimensional private information to manifest
itself in the form of a violation of the positive correlation property, the
supply side of the insurance market has to be noncompetitive in the
sense that the insurance companies are not free to offer any insurance
contract they choose. Thus, the standardization of Medigap policies and
the restrictions on medical underwriting make this market especially
well suited to studying the evidence for multidimensional private
information.
Second, the Medigap market is closely linked to the Medicare pro-
gram. As a result, one can obtain detailed administrative data on di-
agnoses, treatments, and expenditures of consumers in the Medigap
market. Specifically, our analysis relies in part on the Medicare Current
Beneficiary Survey (MCBS), which combines survey data and Medicare
administrative records. The Medicare administrative data on medical
expenditures provide perhaps the most accurate measure of health ex-
penditure risk for a large sample of the entire Medicare population.
The MCBS also contains extensive health measures that allow us to
obtain accurate measures of ex post expenditure conditional on age
and health. Though the MCBS itself does not contain detailed infor-
mation about risk aversion and other potential sources of advantageous
selection, the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), a longitudinal data
set covering a large sample of the Medicare-eligible population, has
information about such variables. Our empirical strategy uses the MCBS
and HRS jointly to examine the sources of advantageous selection.
We find strong evidence of multidimensional private information and
advantageous selection in the Medigap market. Conditional on controls
for the price of Medigap, we find that medical expenditures for senior
2 See Sec. IV for more details about the Medicare program and the Medigap insurance
market.
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citizens with Medigap coverage are, on average, about $4,000 less than
for those without. This strong negative correlation between ex post risk
and coverage cannot be consistent with “no private information” or
“one-dimensional private information” models of the insurance market;
thus it directly indicates the presence of multidimensional private in-
formation, as well as advantageous selection. Indeed, once we condition
on health (which cannot, by law, be used in Medigap pricing), expen-
ditures for seniors with Medigap are about $2,000 more than for those
without. These findings indicate that those who purchase Medigap tend
to be healthier; that is, there is advantageous selection.
Equally important, we investigate several potential sources of this ad-
vantageous selection. This analysis points to variation in cognitive ability
as a prominent source of advantageous selection. We find that elderly
citizens with higher cognitive ability both are more likely to purchase
Medigap and are healthier. We also investigate the potential pathways
through which cognitive ability may act as a source of advantageous
selection.
Interestingly, we find that variation in risk preferences, which was
much discussed in the previous literature, does not appear to be a
primary source of advantageous selection in the Medigap insurance
market. Specifically, we find that even though direct measures of risk
tolerance are significant predictors of Medigap insurance purchase,
those who are more risk averse are not particularly healthy; as a result,
risk preferences do not much contribute to advantageous selection.3
Our paper is most closely related to Finkelstein and McGarry’s (2006)
study of the long-term-care (LTC) insurance market. Using panel data
from a sample of Americans born before 1923 (the Asset and Health
Dynamics among the Oldest Old [AHEAD] study), they find no statis-
tically significant correlation between LTC coverage in 1995 and use of
nursing home care in the period between 1995 and 2000, even after
controlling for insurers’ assessment of a person’s risk type. This evi-
dence, alone, is consistent both with “no asymmetric information” and
with “multidimensional private information.” To distinguish between
these stories, they first eliminated the no asymmetric information in-
terpretation. Specifically, they found that a subjective probability as-
sessment contained in the 1995 AHEAD questionnaire—“What do you
think are the chances that you will move to a nursing home in the next
five years?”—is positively correlated with both LTC coverage and nursing
home use in 1995–2000, even after controlling for insurers’ risk assess-
ment. Since this variable is presumably unobserved by the insurer, these
3 In this regard, our result is similar to that in Cohen and Einav (2007). The authors
inferred both accident risk and risk aversion using an estimated structural model of au-
tomobile insurance deductible choice and found that they are positively correlated, con-
trary to what is required for risk aversion to be a source of advantageous selection.
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positive correlations suggest private information and adverse selection
by the insured.4 Second, they developed a proxy for risk aversion, using
information on whether respondents undertake various types of pre-
ventive health care. They found that people who are more risk averse
by this measure are both more likely to own LTC insurance and less
likely to enter a nursing home—consistent with multidimensional pri-
vate information and advantageous selection based on risk aversion. In
fact, their findings suggest that, on net, adverse selection based on risk
and advantageous selection based on risk aversion roughly cancel out
in the LTC insurance market.
Our paper examines the Medigap market, which, as we argued above,
is especially well suited for a study of advantageous selection. In doing
so, our paper makes three new contributions to the literature.
First, our method of inference for the presence of multidimensional
private information differs from Finkelstein and McGarry’s. We find a
statistically significant and quantitatively large negative correlation be-
tween ex post medical expenditure and Medigap coverage, controlling
for individual characteristics that are used in pricing. The large negative
correlation between Medigap coverage and ex post medical expenditure
is inconsistent with either no asymmetric information or single-dimen-
sional private information, thus leading us directly to an interpretation
of the results as evidence of multidimensional private information and
at the same time as evidence of advantageous selection.
Second, our paper is, to our knowledge, the first to examine directly
multiple potential sources of advantageous selection. Specifically, in-
stead of using behavioral proxies for risk aversion as Finkelstein and
McGarry did, we exploit the direct measures of risk aversion elicited
from the respondents in the HRS data. More important, we examine
not just risk preferences as the source of advantageous selection, but
also several other potential sources.
Third, the empirical evidence in our paper suggests that for the Medi-
gap insurance market, risk preferences, which were much discussed in
the previous literature, do not appear to be a main source of advan-
tageous selection; instead, our results suggest that cognitive ability plays
a prominent role. We also explore various channels through which cog-
nitive ability may lead to advantageous selection.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section II reviews
additional related literature. Section III presents a simple conceptual
framework to illustrate the idea of advantageous selection. Section IV
provides some detailed background about Medicare and the Medigap
4 Finkelstein and Poterba (2006) proposed such use of characteristics of insurance buyers
that are observable to the econometrician but not used by insurers in setting prices as a
general strategy to test for asymmetric information in insurance markets.
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insurance market. Section V describes the MCBS and HRS data sets
used in our analysis. Section VI provides direct and indirect evidence
of advantageous selection using the MCBS data. Section VII examines
the sources of advantageous selection by combining the MCBS and HRS
and presents our main results. Finally, Section VIII presents conclusions.
II. Related Literature
Within the large literature that tests for the presence of asymmetric
information, our paper is most closely related to empirical investigations
of the “positive correlation property,” the robust prediction of standard
equilibrium models that there should be a positive association between
insurance coverage and ex post risk.5 The positive correlation property
has been tested in several recent studies of a variety of markets. The
empirical results are mixed and differ by market. For example, in a life
insurance market, Cawley and Philipson (1999) found that the mortality
rate of U.S. males who purchase life insurance is below that of the
uninsured, even when controlling for many factors such as income that
may be correlated with life expectancy. In an auto insurance market,
Chiappori and Salanie´ (2000) found that accident rates for young
French drivers who choose comprehensive automobile insurance are
not statistically different from the rates of those opting for the legal
minimum coverage, after controlling for observable characteristics
known to automobile insurers. In contrast, Cohen (2005), using data
from Israel, finds that new auto insurance customers choosing a low
deductible tend to have more accidents, leading to higher total losses
for the insurer. Others have examined the evidence of asymmetric in-
formation in the choice of insurance contracts such as deductibles, co-
payments, and so forth. For example, Puelz and Snow (1994) studied
automobile collision insurance and argued that, in an adverse selection
equilibrium, individuals with lower risk will choose a contract with a
higher deductible, and contracts with higher deductibles should be as-
sociated with lower average prices for coverage. They found evidence
in support of each of these predictions using data from an automobile
insurer in Georgia.6 In an annuity insurance market, Finkelstein and
Poterba (2004) found systematic relationships between ex post mortality
and annuity characteristics, such as the timing of payments and the
possibility of payments to the annuitant’s estate, but they do not find
evidence of substantive mortality differences by annuity size. Yet a third
5 See Chiappori and Salanie´ (2000). Chiappori et al. (2006) generalize this empirical
prediction to a larger class of models. Chiappori (2001) provides an extensive survey of
the theoretical and empirical literature.
6 However, see Chiappori and Salanie´ (2000) and Dionne, Gourie´roux, and Vanasse
(2001) for critiques of the Puelz and Snow study.
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approach is to estimate structural models of health insurance and health
care choice. For example, Cardon and Hendel (2001) estimated such
a model using data from the National Medical Expenditure Survey. They
find that estimated price and income elasticities, as well as demographic
differences, can explain the expenditure gap between the insured and
the uninsured. Thus they judge the role of adverse selection to be
economically insignificant.
Our paper is also related to a literature that looks specifically for
evidence of adverse selection in the Medigap market. The results from
that literature are also mixed. For example, Wolfe and Goddeeris (1991),
using data from the Retirement History Survey, found that respondents
with better self-reported health were more likely to purchase Medigap
and that those with Medigap did not spend more on hospital stays,
physician care, and prescription drugs.7 In contrast, Lillard and Ro-
gowski (1995), Ettner (1997), and Hurd and McGarry (1997) found
little evidence of variation in the probability of purchasing private in-
surance by health status. Also related to our paper, Khandker and Mc-
Cormack (1999), using MCBS 1991 and 1993, found that those with
Medigap tended to incur higher levels of Medicare-reimbursed spend-
ing, particularly Part B services. However, because Medigap plans cover
Medicare co-pays, they reduce the out-of-pocket price of Medicare-
covered services. Thus, it is possible that those with basic Medicare alone
may incur more total expenditures, despite smaller Medicare-reim-
bursed expenditures, because they spend more out of pocket. (Indeed,
our table 1 in Sec. V.E is consistent with this view.) Thus, we argue that,
to study selection in the Medigap market, a better measure of health
expenditure risk is total medical expenditure, not just expenditure re-
imbursed by Medicare or Medigap.8
III. Multidimensional Private Information and Advantageous
Selection
It is now well understood that, given multidimensional private infor-
mation, the correlation between ex post risk realizations and coverage
may be negative, zero, or positive (see Hemenway 1990; de Meza and
Webb 2001; Jullien, Salanie´, and Salanie´ 2007). These papers all focus
on private information about risk aversion as the source of advantageous
7 Khandker and McCormack (1996) estimated multinomial logit models of insurance
choice and found that individuals reporting better health were significantly more likely
to enroll in Medigap plans.
8 Unfortunately, the waves of the MCBS data used in Khandker and McCormack’s (1999)
analysis did not contain information about out-of-pocket costs as well as expenses paid by
supplementary insurers. We are grateful to Tami Swenson for the clarification on this data
issue.
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selection. In this section, we present a simple conceptual framework
that shows how multidimensional private information may lead to ad-
vantageous selection.
Consider an individual age 65 or older (and thus covered by Medi-
care) who, with probability , will experience a health expen-p  [0, 1]
diture shock of size , over and above what is covered by Medicare.9L 1 0
For simplicity, assume that the individual can choose to purchase Medi-
gap insurance at a premium m that will reduce the out-of-pocket ex-
penditure to zero. Let g denote a vector of characteristics that may also
affect the individual’s probability of purchasing Medigap. The variables
in g may include risk aversion, but also other characteristics such as
cognitive ability, planning horizons, and so forth. Suppose that in the
population (p, g) is distributed according to a joint cumulative distri-
bution function F. For illustrative purposes, suppose that Q(p, g; L,
is the probability that an individual with risk type p and characteristicsm)
g will purchase Medigap when the expenditure shock is L and the
premium is m. For example, if g measures risk aversion, we can show
that is increasing in risk type p and risk aversion g; thatQ(7, 7; L, m)
is, more risky and more risk-averse individuals are more likely to pur-
chase Medigap (see Fang, Keane, and Silverman 2006). In standard
insurance models in which risk type p is the only dimension of hetero-
geneity, g is implicitly assumed to be constant in the population. For
simplicity, we suppress the dependence of Q on L and m below.
We can describe the “positive correlation property” test of Chiappori
and Salanie´ (2000) within this simple conceptual framework. The test
compares the average health shock occurrence for those with and with-
out Medigap insurance. In our framework, the average health shocks
among those with and without Medigap insurance are respectively given
by
pQ(p, g)dF(p, g)∫ ∫
A p (1)Medigap Q(p, g)dF(p, g)∫ ∫
and
p[1 Q(p, g)]dF(p, g)∫ ∫
A p , (2)No_Medigap [1 Q(p, g)]dF(p, g)∫ ∫
where the denominator in (1) (and respectively in [2]) is the measure
of individuals who purchase (respectively, do not purchase) Medigap,
and the numerator is the expected number of health shocks that occur
to those who purchase (respectively, do not purchase) Medigap. The
9 We assume away the price effect, also called “moral hazard,” by assuming that the
expenditure level L does not depend on health insurance status.
sources of advantageous selection 311
test of the positive correlation property asks whether A 1Medigap
. This condition obviously holds if g is constant in the popu-ANo_Medigap
lation and increases in p. However, if g is heterogeneous in theQ(7, g)
population and if at least one element satisfies the following twog  g
conditions,10 then the sign of is ambiguous.A  AMedigap No_Medigap
Property 1. g is positively correlated with insurance coverage; that
is, is increasing in g.Q(p, g)
Property 2. g is negatively correlated with risk p.
Moreover, the average probability of insurance purchase for a given
risk type p (after integrating out g), namely, ,˜Q(p)p Q(p, g)dF (gFp)∫ gFp
may not be monotonic in p if at least one element of g satisfies the
above properties. We will say that private information item g is a source
of advantageous selection if it satisfies these two properties.
The above discussion is merely illustrative; we only analyze individuals’
insurance purchase decisions assuming a particular equilibrium (i.e., a
particular menu of insurance options) and do not consider a more
complete model in which insurance companies may compete by offering
different insurance contracts. There does not yet exist an equilibrium
model of an insurance market with multidimensional private informa-
tion.
In our empirical analysis, we first provide, in Section VI, evidence
that is akin to ; that is, we find that the health ex-A ! AMedigap No_Medigap
penditure risk for those with Medigap insurance is lower than the risk
of those without Medigap insurance. This immediately suggests the pres-
ence of multidimensional private information generating advantageous
selection. Then, in Section VII, we examine the sources of advantageous
selection; that is, we look for elements of g that may account for the
earlier finding that .A ! AMedigap No_Medigap
IV. Institutional Background
A. Medicare
Medicare is the primary health insurance program for most seniors in
the United States. All Americans age 65 and older who have, or whose
spouses have, paid Medicare taxes for more than 40 quarters are eligible.
During the period we study, the original Medicare plan consisted of
Parts A and B. Part A, the hospital insurance program, covers inpatient
hospital, skilled nursing facility, and some home health care. Almost all
10 Of course, any g that is negatively correlated with insurance coverage and positively
correlated with risk p will also work. Moreover, the negative correlation between g and
risk p may arise either exogenously or endogenously (in the sense that the would-be insured
with a higher g may take an action to reduce p). For our purpose this distinction is
unimportant.
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retirees are automatically enrolled in Part A when they turn 65, and
there are no premiums for this coverage. Medicare Part B, also called
Medicare Insurance, covers Medicare-eligible physician services, out-
patient hospital services, certain home health services, and durable med-
ical equipment. Part B enrollees have to pay a monthly premium, which
was $67 in 2004. Almost all people choose to enroll in Part B when they
turn 65. Under Part B, individuals were responsible for a $110 deductible
in 2005 and face a 20 percent co-pay for all Medicare-approved services
after exceeding the deductible. The basic Medicare plan is available
everywhere in the country.11 Some areas also offer what are now called
Medicare Advantage Plans, which are managed care plans (either health
maintenance organizations [HMOs] or preferred provider organiza-
tions). In 2001, approximately 15 percent of Medicare beneficiaries were
enrolled in such Medicare HMOs. We discuss Medicare HMOs further
in Sections V.C and VI.C. During the period we analyze, Medicare did
not cover prescription drugs.
B. Medigap
While Medicare is the primary health insurance for most older Amer-
icans, the program leaves seniors at significant risk of health expendi-
tures. On average, basic Medicare benefits cover about 45 percent of
the personal health care expenditures of aged beneficiaries in the
United States (Kaiser Family Foundation 2005). To insure Medicare
beneficiaries against some of that risk, private insurance companies sell
“Medigap” policies that cover some of the co-pays, deductibles, and
uncovered expenses, that is, the “gaps” in the basic Medicare plan.
One reason the Medigap insurance market is ideal for studying mul-
tidimensional private information is that, as a result of the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 (OBRA 1990) effective from 1992,
Medigap policies are standardized into 10 plans, A–J, in all states except
Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Wisconsin.12 The basic plan, A, covers
all co-pays for hospital stays longer than 60 days and all co-pays for
physician visits and outpatient care (but not the deductible). All other
plans offer these basic benefits, and more. Details of the different con-
stellation of benefits from plans A–J can be found in CMS (2005, 33–
35). The restrictions on the Medigap plans have important implications
for whether multidimensional private information will manifest itself
through a violation of the positive correlation property. Without restric-
tions on the insurance contracts that insurance companies can offer,
11 For further details about the coverage offered by Medicare Parts A and B, see CMS
(2005, 55–64).
12 These states received waivers that allow them to offer somewhat different standardized
plans.
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Chiappori et al. (2006) showed that a suitably modified version of the
positive correlation property still holds even with multidimensional pri-
vate information.
OBRA 1990 also regulated Medigap pricing and enrollment in ways
that tend to amplify the asymmetries of information favoring the in-
sured. Most important, Medigap policies are required by law to have an
open-enrollment period. This 6-month period begins after the first day
of the first month an individual both is age 65 or older and is enrolled
in Medicare Part B. During this period, insurers cannot deny or delay
Medigap coverage.13 Moreover, during open enrollment, the federal
legislation prohibits insurers from medical underwriting in pricing Med-
igap policies; they can effectively price only on age, gender, smoking
status, and state of residence.14
C. Medigap Pricing
While federal regulations prohibit insurers from medical underwriting
in Medigap pricing during the open-enrollment period, in a market
served by multiple insurers, different firms may price the same policies
differently. Indeed, using Medigap premium data from Weiss Ratings,
Maestas et al. (2006) documented substantial price variation for the
same Medigap policies. They argued that search costs play an important
role in explaining the price dispersion for these seemingly homoge-
neous products. Robst (2006), using the same data, found that the
average premium an individual faces for a given Medigap plan depends
almost exclusively on his or her age, gender, and state of residence.
In our analysis below, we use age, gender, and state of residence to
control for Medigap pricing.15 The dispersion in Medigap prices doc-
umented by Maestas et al. (2006) does not invalidate these controls for
Medigap pricing because, given the federal regulations, during the
open-enrollment period all individuals are offered the same set of Medi-
gap plans, and hence they face the same distribution of prices condi-
13 States also have the option of going beyond the federal regulations regarding the 6-
month open-enrollment period. Connecticut and New York, e.g., have indefinite open
enrollment (i.e., no medical underwriting is ever permitted), whereas California, Maine,
and Massachusetts have an annual open-enrollment period of 1 month around a person’s
birthday (Lewin Group 2001).
14 In principle, insurers are free to vary prices by zip code or county. However, the most
comprehensive Medigap premium data from Weiss Ratings show that, for any given insurer,
most premium variation occurs across rather than within states. The reason could be that
the number of policyholders per zip code or county is too small for risk pooling (see
Maestas, Schroeder, and Goldman 2006).
15 Robst (2006, table 3) showed that less than 10 percent of all available Medigap plans
offered a small average $100 discount for nonsmokers (from Weiss Ratings data). We do
not control for smoker status in our basic analysis because such smoker discounts are
available in only a small number of states.
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tional on these variables. It may be that, as Maestas et al. argued, dif-
ferences in search costs lead some individuals to face different effective
prices than others in the same market. If so, it would be important to
understand the sources of this variation in search costs. Most relevant
for this paper, we would like to know whether cognitive ability and other
factors function as sources of advantageous selection through their ef-
fects on costs of price search. In Section VII.D, we consider in greater
depth this and other pathways through which cognitive ability and other
factors induce advantageous selection.
The government also requires that, after the open enrollment, as long
as the would-be insured has had Medigap coverage for the past 6 months,
enrollment in a different plan offered by the same company be guar-
anteed by law. However, if an individual did not enroll in Medigap in
the open-enrollment period or if his or her Medigap coverage lapsed,
then insurance companies may subsequently impose both coverage and
pricing rules different from those that apply during the open-enrollment
period. In these circumstances, our Medigap price controls (age poly-
nomial, gender, and state of residence) may not reflect the prices such
individuals face. Any potential problems caused by such situations, how-
ever, are still consistent with our interpretation of advantageous selection
(see Sec. VI.D for the details).
V. Data and Descriptive Statistics
Our analysis relies on two large data sets, the MCBS and HRS. Here we
provide a basic description of these data and descriptive statistics of the
selected samples in each.
A. Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey
The MCBS began in September 1991 and is a continuous panel survey
of a nationally representative sample of the Medicare population.16 Ben-
eficiaries sampled from Medicare enrollment files (or appropriate prox-
ies) are interviewed in person, three times a year, using computer-
assisted personal interviewing. All the MCBS survey data are linked to
Medicare claims and other administrative data. The final file consists
of survey, administrative, and claims data and thus provides a compre-
hensive view of respondents’ heath care costs and use.
The central goal of the MCBS is to determine expenditures and
sources of payment for all services used by Medicare beneficiaries, in-
16 See http://www.cms.hhs.gov/mcbs/ for more details. A supplemental sample is added
annually in the September–December round to replenish sample cells depleted by refusals
and deaths.
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cluding co-payments, deductibles, and uncovered services. This is im-
portant, since our focus is on the total health expenditure, that is, the
combined expenditures that were covered by Medicare, other public
insurance, or private insurance or paid out of pocket. In addition, the
MCBS also contains extensive information on the health and demo-
graphics of respondents and whether respondents have supplemental
insurance. The Data Appendix (table A1) provides a detailed description
of how the variables used in our analysis are constructed.
B. Health and Retirement Study
The HRS began in 1992 as a panel survey of a nationally representative
sample of people born between 1931 and 1941 and their spouses. This
original cohort has been reinterviewed every other year since. In 1998,
the objective of the HRS was expanded to include learning about the
entire U.S. population over age 50. To achieve this goal, the original
HRS survey was merged with an existing and related survey of individuals
born in 1923 or before, the AHEAD. In addition, two more samples
were added: the “Children of the Depression” (CODA) cohort born
between 1924 and 1930 and the “War Baby” cohort born between 1942
and 1947. Our interest in those over age 65 leads us to limit our analysis
to health and insurance data collected in the 2000 and 2002 waves of
the HRS, the latest years for which a final version of the data is available.
Whenever possible we include data from all HRS cohorts.17
The HRS is particularly well suited for studying advantageous selection
in Medigap insurance. It contains detailed information about current
and past health status of respondents as well as rich data on their in-
surance choices. The health information includes both self-reported
health and a very large set of objective measures, such as diseases di-
agnosed, and a list of activities the respondent has difficulty performing.
The insurance data include information on where the insurance was
acquired, its premiums, and its coverage. The HRS also contains high-
quality information about economic and demographic variables. How-
ever, the HRS does not have comprehensive information about total
medical expenditure.18 In Section VII we describe procedures to impute
17 In the end, 37 percent of our combined HRS sample comes from the original HRS,
44 percent from AHEAD, and 19 percent from CODA cohort respondents. Because we
use only the 2000 and 2002 waves of the HRS, we use only the 2000 and 2001 waves of
the MCBS in our main analysis, though we also used lagged health measures from the
1999 MCBS in several specification checks.
18 Even with the Medicare claims data that were recently linked to the HRS, we still lack
comprehensive information about medical expenditure that is not paid by Medicare. As
table 1 below shows for the MCBS sample, Medicare-reimbursed expenditure differs sub-
stantially from the total medical expenditure.
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medical expenditure for the HRS sample using the information in the
MCBS.
Equally important, the HRS is unusual in its attention to variables
central to economic theory, including measures of risk attitudes, lon-
gevity expectations, and financial planning horizons; it also contains
several measures of cognitive ability.19 The measures of risk attitudes we
use are based on HRS respondents’ choices over a series of hypothetical
gambles. The responses to these gambles place respondents into four
ordered risk categories. Assuming that an individual’s responses to these
hypothetical income gambles are error-prone reflections of his or her
fixed, constant relative risk aversion preferences, Kimball, Sahm, and
Shapiro (forthcoming) estimate the risk tolerance for each respondent
in the HRS by maximum likelihood. In the bulk of our analysis, we use
their estimates to form our measures of risk aversion (see their table
6).20
Longevity expectations may also play a role in determining health
insurance choices, though the net effect of higher longevity expectations
on investment in health is theoretically ambiguous. Those who expect
to live longer may want to spend more now on their health since such
investment will pay dividends over a longer horizon (see Khwaja 2005).
Thus, they would demand more insurance. However, the marginal value
of additional current health investment may be lower when a long life
already seems likely. The HRS asked of all respondents age 65 and
younger, and repeated in every HRS wave, “What is [percent chance]
you will live to 75 or more?” In our analysis, we use the most recent
available response to this question as our measure of longevity
expectations.21
Similarly, the length of financial planning horizons (which presum-
ably reflects both uncertainty and the subjective rate of time discount)
may influence insurance choices. Here the effect seems unambiguous,
since those with longer horizons would be more willing to pay immediate
costs (premiums) to avoid expected future costs. The HRS collects in-
formation on financial planning horizons by asking respondents how
19 Details of these measures can be found in Fang et al. (2006, sec. 5.2).
20 While risk attitudes solicited from choices over hypothetical gambles are undoubtedly
measured with error, a number of studies have found the answers to these questions to
be significant predictors of risk-taking behavior. See, e.g., Barsky et al. (1997) on smoking,
drinking, and insurance purchase; Lusardi (1998) on wealth accumulation; Charles and
Hurst (2003) and Kimball et al. (forthcoming) on portfolio choice; Kan (2003) on resi-
dential and job mobility; and Schmidt (forthcoming) on the timing of fertility and mar-
riage. In Sec. VII.C, we will also find that it is a strong predictor of Medigap purchase.
21 This question presumably measures longevity expectations with error and may reflect
both beliefs about longevity and the degree of certainty about those beliefs. Evidence
consistent with both error and uncertainty about beliefs is found in the heaping of re-
sponses around focal responses such as zero, 50, and, to a lesser extent, 100. See Kezdi
and Willis (2005) for a thorough discussion of these measures.
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far ahead they plan the family’s saving and spending, ranging from “next
few months” to “longer than 10 years” in five categories.
Finally, our measure of a person’s cognition combines his or her
performance on four different tests/questions: word recall, a Telephone
Interview for Cognitive Status (TICS) score, subtraction, and numeracy.
These scores may proxy for an individual’s degree of economic “ratio-
nality,” that is, his or her ability to think through the costs and benefits
of Medigap insurance. Indeed, there is a large body of literature showing
that many of the elderly have difficulty understanding the basic Medi-
care entitlement and/or the features of supplemental insurance.22
C. Sample Selection and Medigap Insurance Status
Both the MCBS and HRS contain detailed information about respon-
dents’ health insurance choices. Each reports whether the respondent
is covered by Medicare, Parts A and B, and whether that coverage is
provided by a Medicare HMO. We also know whether the respondent
had supplemental coverage and, if so, its premium and its source.
Given that our goal is to study the decision to buy supplemental insur-
ance, our sample should include only people who are covered by basic
Medicare (Parts A and B) and do not have access to free (or heavily
subsidized) supplemental coverage provided by a former employer, Med-
icaid, or some other government agency (e.g., the Veterans Adminis-
tration). That is, we want to limit the sample to people who would have
to pay more than a nominal premium to obtain supplemental coverage.
Owing to these considerations, in our analysis we include only respon-
dents covered by basic Medicare (including those in a Medicare HMO)
and exclude anyone covered by employer-provided health insurance,
Medicaid, or other government insurance. In this selected sample, we
define the Medigap status to be equal to one if the respondent has
purchased additional private insurance that is secondary to Medicare.23
In our main analysis, we treat Medicare HMO enrollees as having
basic Medicare.24 This choice is motivated by three considerations. First,
22 See, e.g., Harris and Keane (1998) for empirical evidence, Keane (2004) for a survey
of the literature, and Sec. VII.D for additional references.
23 In our working paper (Fang et al. 2006), we also report results from an alternative
sample selection in which we retain respondents who have employer-provided supple-
mental insurance, provided that they must pay at least $500 per year in premiums for that
insurance. We then define Medigap status as equal to one if the respondent either has
purchased private insurance that is secondary to Medicare or has employer-provided in-
surance for which he or she pays at least $500 in premiums. None of our results, either
qualitatively or quantitatively, depends on which definition of Medigap status we use.
24 The general view is that Medicare HMOs exchange restrictions on the choices for
medical treatment for additional coverage similar to that provided by typical Medigap
policies. Enrollees of Medicare HMOs are discouraged, though not precluded, from pur-
chasing additional Medigap insurance policies (see CMS 2005, 5).
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60 percent of Medicare HMO enrollees do not pay an additional pre-
mium; thus their decision to enroll in a Medicare HMO is often really
a trade-off between restrictions on provider choice and additional cov-
erage for the gaps in Medicare; it is not a decision to pay for additional
coverage. Second, Medicare HMOs are not available in all markets; they
are typically not offered in rural areas. Third, several recent studies have
shown that those who enrolled in Medicare HMOs are, on average,
healthier than those on basic Medicare (see Cox and Hogan 1997;
Banthin and Taylor 2001). Moreover, Desmond, Rice, and Fox (2006)
suggest that greater Medicare HMO enrollment might cause adverse
selection into Medigap. Thus, we think that it is conservative to classify
Medicare HMO enrollees as choosing only basic Medicare, in the sense
that it makes it less likely we will find advantageous selection into Medi-
gap. However, panel B of table 5 below reports results in which we either
code Medicare HMO enrollees as having Medigap or instead drop them
from the analysis. The qualitative results do not change; indeed, as
expected, the evidence for advantageous selection becomes even stron-
ger when they are dropped.
D. Measures of Health and Medical Expenditure Risk
Both the MCBS and HRS have detailed and comparable measures of
observable health indicators including self-reported health, activities of
daily living (ADL) limitations, instrumental ADL limitations, various
diagnoses/treatments, and others (see the category Health in the Data
Appendix for more details).
For our measure of ex post health expenditure risk, we use “total
medical expenditure,” which corresponds to the variable pamttot in the
MCBS. It is constructed by CMS from a variety of sources, including
Medicare administrative records and survey responses.25 In calculating
pamttot, CMS includes, for any health care event identified either from
the survey respondent or from the respondent’s Medicare file, payments
from 11 potential sources: Medicare fee-for-service, Medicare HMOs,
Medicaid, employer-based private health insurance, individually pur-
chased private health insurance, private insurance managed care, private
insurance from unknown sources, the VA and other public insurance,
out-of-pocket payments, and uncollected liability. Thus, the variable
pamttot comes as close as possible to measuring total health expenditure
from all sources.
An important question is whether total medical expenditure is indeed
the most relevant measure of expenditure risk when a would-be insured
25 See MCBS public use documentation on “Cost and Use,” secs. 3 and 5, for more
details. This documentation is available online at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/apps/mcbs/.
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contemplates whether to purchase Medigap. One argument in favor of
treating total medical expenditure as the relevant risk is that Medigap
policies by law cover broad ranges of expenditure not covered by Med-
icare (i.e., Medicare deductibles, co-pays, and prescription drugs). A
person in worse health would typically tend to have greater expenditure
risk in all these areas. Thus, to a good approximation, Medigap plans
can reasonably be thought of a simply providing “more” coverage in a
unidimensional health risk framework, because by law Medigap plans
cannot be structured to only cover particular health conditions.
E. Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics for the Medigap and no
Medigap samples, separately for the MCBS and HRS. In both the MCBS
and the HRS samples, there are no significant differences between the
Medigap and no Medigap subsamples in gender and age, but they do
differ significantly in their educational attainment and marital status.
Interestingly, in the MCBS, the mean total medical expenditure is more
than $12,000 for those with no Medigap, whereas it is only about $8,400
for those with Medigap. However, the medical expenditure reimbursed
by Medicare is slightly higher for those with Medigap than for those
without, consistent with the findings in the literature (see, e.g., Khand-
ker and McCormack 1999).
Table 1 also shows that the MCBS and HRS samples are quite similar
in the means of the common set of demographic variables. This suggests
that using the MCBS to impute means and variances of medical expen-
diture for the HRS is reasonable.
VI. Evidence of Advantageous Selection
In this section we present a set of simple regressions that together pro-
vide strong evidence of advantageous selection in the Medigap market:
those who purchase Medigap appear to be healthier and to have lower
ex post medical expenditure. We also present direct evidence that
healthier people are more likely to purchase Medigap insurance, con-
ditional on observables that determine price.
A. Basic Regression Results: Indirect Evidence of Advantageous Selection
Table 2 reports two panels of results from regressing total medical ex-
penditure on Medigap status along with controls for the determinants
of price (gender, a third-order polynomial of age, and controls for state
and year), with or without controlling for health status of the individuals.
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TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics of Selected Variables
MCBS HRS
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Note.—Statistics are calculated using cross-section sample weights. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Number
of observations varies by variable and sample.
Each panel reports results separately for the full sample and for male
and female subsamples.
In panel A, where no health controls are included, we find a large
and statistically significant relationship between total medical expen-
diture and Medigap status. Specifically, in the whole sample, those with
Medigap have expenditures that are, on average, about $4,000 less than
those without Medigap; the negative relationship between Medigap cov-
erage and total medical expenditure is stronger for women (about
$6,000) than for men (about $2,000).
The regressions in panel B are analogous to those in panel A, but
with the addition of extensive controls for health, which we describe in
detail in the Data Appendix. Conditional on observable (but not priced)
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TABLE 2
Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results of Total Medical Expenditure on
“Medigap” Coverage in the MCBS
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State dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 15,945 9,725 6,220 14,129 8,371 5,758
Adjusted 2R .073 .092 .060 .211 .196 .252
Note.—The dependent variable is total medical expenditure. All regressions are weighted by the cross-section sample
weights. Health controls included in panel B are described in detail in the Data Appendix under the category Health.
A total of 71 health indicators are included. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are in parentheses.
* Significant at 10 percent.
** Significant at 5 percent.
*** Significant at 1 percent.
health indicators, in the full sample, those with Medigap have total
health care spending of about $1,900 more, on average, than those
without Medigap. The positive association between Medigap and total
medical expenditure seems to be stronger for men (about $2,400) than
for women (about $1,700).
As we argued in the introduction, the results in panel A alone indicate
the presence of multidimensional private information. The results of
panels A and B together imply, indirectly, that there is advantageous
selection in the Medigap market; that is, those with better health are
more likely to purchase Medigap. That is the only way to rationalize
simultaneously the large negative correlation between Medigap and ex
post health expenditure in panel A without health controls and the
large positive correlation with health controls in panel B. The results
in panel B indicate that once we condition on health status, those with
Medigap have higher total health expenditures. This is what we would
expect from the effects of moral hazard; for individuals with the same
health, those with Medigap insurance face a lower price of health care.
B. More Direct Evidence of Advantageous Selection
To provide somewhat more direct evidence of advantageous selection,
we now try to find a small number of health factors to summarize the
extensive list of health variables used in the regressions reported in
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panel B of table 2 and then directly examine the partial correlations of
the health factors and Medigap status. We analyzed the extensive list of
health variables and found that there are four significant health factors
that can capture the bulk of variance and covariance in the list of ob-
servable health variables. To be conservative, we include five factors for
our subsequent analysis. Moreover, by examining the factor loadings
(not reported), we can offer interpretations of these factors.26 Factor 1
can be interpreted as a “nonresponse” factor, which loads heavily on
variables that are indicators of nonresponse (i.e., there is a nonre-
sponder type). Factor 2 loads negatively on self-reported health and
positively on difficulties in instrumental ADLs and thus is an unhealthy
factor. Factor 3 loads positively on self-reported health and negatively
on measured medical conditions in the past 2 years and thus is a healthy
factor. Factor 4 loads positively on self-reported health and self-reported
health changes in the last year. It represents a part of self-reported health
not captured by factors 2 and 3. Factor 5 does not appear to have a
clear interpretation.
Table 3 reports results from regressions analogous to those in panel
B of table 2, except that our extensive list of health variables is sum-
marized by five health factors extracted using factor analysis. The co-
efficient estimates for Medigap in table 3 are qualitatively unchanged
from those in panel B of table 2. As expected, factor 2 is positively
related to health care expenditure, factors 3 and 4 are negatively related,
and factors 1 and 5 are not related.27 The standard deviations of the
factors are presented in brackets in the Variable column. For example,
a one-standard-deviation increase in the most important unhealthy fac-
tor, factor 2, will increase medical expenditure by about $4,800 for both
men and women; a one-standard-deviation increase in the most impor-
tant healthy factor, factor 3, will reduce medical expenditure by about
$2,300 for women and about $3,200 for men. The other factors, factors
1, 4, and 5, are of much smaller magnitude and are often statistically
insignificant.
These health factors allow us to examine more directly whether
healthy individuals are more likely to purchase Medigap. Table 4 reports
the partial correlations between Medigap coverage and the health fac-
tors, conditional on gender and age. The columns labeled EXP simply
report the regression coefficients for the health factors from specifi-
cation 1 in table 3. These coefficient estimates inform us whether the
factor is “healthy” or “unhealthy.” The columns labeled PCORR report
the partial correlations and their level of significance.
26 The factor loadings are available from the authors on request.
27 The health factors for the three samples are separately estimated, and, as a result,
the factors for the three samples are actually different factors.
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TABLE 3
Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results of Total Medical Expenditure on
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State dummy Yes Yes Yes
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes
Other demographic controls No No No
Observations 14,129 8,371 5,758
Adjusted 2R .14 .13 .18
Note.—The dependent variable is total medical expenditure. All regressions are weighted by the cross-section sample
weights. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are in parentheses. The standard deviations of the
factors are in brackets in the Variable column. Factor 2 is the major unhealthy factor, factors 3 and 4 are the healthy
factors, factor 1 captures nonresponse, and factor 5 does not have a clear interpretation.
* Significant at 10 percent.
** Significant at 5 percent.
*** Significant at 1 percent.
For the most part, table 4 reveals a consistent pattern: important
unhealthy (healthy) factors tend to have negative (positive) and signif-
icant partial correlations with Medigap coverage. For example, column
2 shows that factor 2, the most important unhealthy factor, has a sizable
negative correlation with Medigap (.1166) and a p-value of almost
zero; in contrast, factor 3, the most important healthy factor, has a
positive correlation with Medigap (.0319) and, again, a p-value of almost
zero. The factors that have Medigap correlations of the “wrong” sign
are typically of two kinds: either the factor itself is not very important
(with small and insignificant coefficient estimates) or the partial cor-
relation is statistically insignificant. The partial correlations between
factors 2 and 3 and Medigap status in the male and female subsamples
have the same signs and magnitudes similar to those for the whole
sample.
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TABLE 4
Partial Correlation between Medigap Coverage and Health Factors in the













































Observations 14,129 8,371 5,758
Note.—The columns labled EXP are the regression coefficients from table 3. They are included in this table for the
interpretation of the factors. The columns labeled PCORR list the partial correlations of Medigap with the corresponding
factors. The numbers in parentheses are the significance levels of the partial correlations.
* Significant at 10 percent.
** Significant at 5 percent.
*** Significant at 1 percent.
C. Robustness Checks
We now show that our qualitative results about advantageous selection
in the Medigap market are robust to a number of alternative data-coding
choices.
Alternative unidimensional measures of health.—Our qualitative findings
about advantageous selection remain unchanged if we replace total med-
ical expenditure as a unidimensional measure of health with the level
of medical expenditure that is not reimbursed by Medicare. We call this
alternative measure “potential Medigap expenditure” because it is ar-
guably a good approximation of the expenditure risk faced by a person
who has only basic Medicare coverage.
Column 1 in panel A of table 5 simply reproduces the Medigap co-
efficients from table 3 (for the All sample), and column 2 presents the
results using potential Medigap expenditure as the dependent variable.
The first row in each column is the baseline specification that includes
only gender, an age polynomial, and state of residence as controls for
price, and the second row adds direct controls for health. As can be
seen from panel A, if we use potential Medigap expenditure as an al-
ternative measure of health expenditure risk, the basic message of ad-
vantageous selection persists: when we control only for variables used
to price Medigap, the Medigap coefficients are in the range of $4,000.
But when we control for health, they turn positive. The positive values
are not as large when we use potential Medigap expenditure as the
measure of health. But the key point is that inclusion of the observable
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TABLE 5
Robustness of the Evidence of Advantageous Selection: Medigap Coefficients












































































Note.—All regressions are weighted by the cross-section sample weights. The descriptions of the direct health
controls can be found in the Data Appendix. The additional demographic controls used in panel D include race,
education, marital status, income, working, and number of children. Robust standard errors in parentheses are
clustered at the individual level.
* Significant at 10 percent.
** Significant at 5 percent.
*** Significant at 1 percent.
health variables significantly increases the magnitude of the Medigap
coefficient in either case, thus indicating, once again, that those with
Medigap are healthier.
Alternative treatments of Medicare HMOs.—In our data, approximately
15 percent of all Medicare beneficiaries chose to participate in a Med-
icare HMO. So far, we have treated them the same as those with basic
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fee-for-service Medicare. We now show the results with two alternative
treatments of those with Medicare HMOs: we either code them as having
Medigap or code them as missing (thus dropping them from our
analysis).
Panel B of table 5 reports the Medigap coefficient estimates under
the two alternative treatments of Medicare HMOs. Column 1 shows that
the recoding of Medicare HMO participants as Medigap actually some-
what strengthens the findings of advantageous selection reported earlier.
For example, the negative Medigap coefficient becomes somewhat more
negative. This is not surprising given the consensus in the literature
(noted earlier) that there is advantageous selection into Medicare
HMOs. Similarly, dropping those observations from our analysis does
not change the results, either qualitatively or quantitatively.
Trimming the outliers.—It is well known that the distribution of medical
expenditure is right skewed. For example, in our selected sample, total
medical expenditure has a skewness of 4.2, with a mean of $10,679 and
a median of $3,467; potential Medigap expenditure has a skewness of
3.5, a mean of $6,040, and a median of $2,292. In our view, outlier
medical expenditures are likely an important concern when individuals
consider whether to purchase Medigap. Nevertheless, we show in panel
C of table 5 that the findings of advantageous selection are not solely
driven by the highest expenditure levels. In column 1 we report the
Medigap coefficient estimates after we drop the observations whose total
medical expenditure is above the ninety-fifth percentile. The coefficient
estimates, not surprisingly, get smaller in absolute magnitude, but the
qualitative conclusion regarding the presence of advantageous selection
is not affected. Column 2 reports the results for potential Medigap
expenditure after we trim the top 5 percent. Again, the coefficients are
smaller in magnitude, but the qualitative results are the same.
D. Discussion
In this subsection we consider a few issues of potential concern regard-
ing the interpretation of our findings.
Insurers’ selection.—A natural question is whether the advantageous
selection we documented for the Medigap insurance market is, as we
interpret it, driven by consumers or is instead induced by insurers.
Insurers have incentives to “cream-skim,” that is, target their offerings
at relatively good risks, because medical underwriting is prohibited.
Three observations cast some doubt on the importance of cream-skim-
ming in explaining the advantageous selection we observe. First, the
best evidence for cream-skimming in related markets comes from se-
lection into Medicare HMOs, not Medigap, and in our main analysis
we classify those in Medicare HMOs as in basic Medicare. And as we
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saw in Section VI.C, dropping Medicare HMO enrollees from the anal-
ysis has little effect on our estimates of advantageous selection into
Medigap. (Indeed, if anything, the evidence for advantageous selection
becomes stronger, consistent with cream-skimming in the Medicare
HMOs.)
Second, as Maestas et al. (2006) noted from the data from Weiss
Ratings, about two-thirds of the Medigap policies sold are agent-solicited
and only about one-third are sold by the insurance companies directly.
It seems likely that the incentives of agents and insurance companies
are not perfectly aligned: agents want to sell policies and care less about
the risk to the insurance company of a given contract. Thus, without
compensation schemes that reflect ex post risk, agents will choose to
locate their offices and market their products where they can sell in-
surance and pay little attention to ex post risks to the insurance
companies.
Third, we can ask whether the extent of advantageous selection is
mitigated if we condition on observable demographics of the consumers,
including race, education, marital status, income, working status, and
number of children, which insurance companies could use to cream-
skim to the extent that they may be correlated with the health expen-
diture risks of the insured.28 Panel D of table 5 reports the Medigap
coefficients with and without health controls, but including the above
list of additional demographic controls. Controlling for the additional
demographics does lower the magnitude of the Medigap coefficient,
but only modestly. For example, without health controls, expenditures
for those with Medigap are about $3,800 less than for those without
Medigap for the whole sample, compared to $4,400 without the de-
mographic controls. Similarly, with direct health controls, the Medigap
coefficient estimate falls only slightly to $1,700 with the additional de-
mographic controls for the whole sample, compared to $1,967 without.
The effects of these additional demographic controls are similar in the
female and male samples. This evidence suggests that our finding of
advantageous selection is not mainly driven by insurers’ selection.
Panel D of table 5 can also be seen to show that even though these
additional demographic variables can explain part of the observed ad-
vantageous selection, the extent is rather limited. As a result, in the
next section we will extend our search for the sources of advantageous
selection.
Endogenous health measures.—Another possible concern is that the
health measures we used in our analysis could be affected by Medigap
28 It is important to emphasize that, in order to establish the existence of advantageous
selection, we should not include these additional demographic variables because insurance
companies are not allowed to price on them.
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insurance status itself. It is possible that if those with Medigap are more
likely to seek care, they may be more likely to have certain conditions
diagnosed. This would make the Medigap population seem less healthy
than they actually are (relative to the basic Medicare population). This
would cause them to have lower than expected expenditure (conditional
on health), thus biasing the Medigap coefficient in panel B of table 2
in a negative direction (i.e., we would understate the degree of advan-
tageous selection).29
Selection in Medigap renewal.—Yet another potential concern is that our
Medigap price controls (age polynomial, gender, and state of residence)
do not reflect the prices faced by those who let their coverage lapse
because the prohibition on medical underwriting in Medigap pricing
applies in most states only in the open-enrollment period. In this case,
our finding that expenditures for those with Medigap are about $4,000
less than for those without may, to some extent, reflect the following
possibility: those without Medigap are less healthy because their cov-
erage previously lapsed and, moreover, they are currently priced out of
Medigap because of their poor health. Because the MCBS panel is rel-
atively short, we do not have Medigap coverage information for a large
number of individuals since their open enrollment. However, we argue
here that if the mechanism described above is influencing our estimates,
its effect is nonetheless consistent with our interpretation of advanta-
geous selection.
Consider the group of individuals without Medigap who are unhealthy
and are priced out of Medigap because of a lapse in their coverage.
One possibility is that they never purchased a Medigap policy in the
first place. This would be consistent with our interpretation of advan-
tageous selection: less healthy individuals are less likely to purchase
Medigap during open enrollment (when everyone is approximately the
same age, and thus state and gender controls alone would be sufficient
to control for Medigap pricing). The second possibility is that those
currently without Medigap did purchase a policy during open enroll-
ment but subsequently failed to renew. The standard adverse selection
model with one-dimensional private information about risk would have
suggested that less healthy people should be more likely to renew, just
as they should be more likely to enroll in the first place. If, in contrast,
less healthy people are less likely to renew, this is again a form of ad-
vantageous selection, albeit in the renewal stage.
29 In any case, our results are not changed if we perform our analysis using lagged,
instead of current, health indicators.
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VII. Sources of Advantageous Selection
In this section we investigate the sources of advantageous selection. That
is, we seek to identify dimensions of individuals’ private information
that satisfy the two properties we mentioned in Section III, that is, un-
priced variables that both (i) make individuals more likely to purchase
Medigap and (ii) are negatively correlated with their health expenditure
risk.
A. Empirical Strategy
The ideal data set for our analysis would be the HRS augmented by
links to Medicare administrative data containing information on total
medical expenditure. Unfortunately, the HRS is not yet properly linked
to the Medicare administrative records and has imperfect information
on out-of-pocket spending or spending reimbursed by other sources
relative to MCBS. On the other hand, the MCBS does not contain in-
formation about many suspected sources of advantageous selection. We
now describe our empirical strategy, which combines the MCBS and the
HRS to examine the sources of advantageous selection.30
The data in the MCBS can be written as
{E , M , H , D } (3)i i i i iIMCBS
and the data in the HRS as
{M , H , D , X } , (4)j j j j jIHRS
where and denote the MCBS and HRS samples, respectively.I IMCBS HRS
Note that the variables , which denote Medigap coverage,{M, H, D}
health measures, and demographics, are common to both data sets. But
E, total medical expenditure, appears only in the MCBS, and X, the list
of variables that we think are potential sources of advantageous selec-
tion, appears only in the HRS.
Our strategy is simple and consists of two steps. In the first step, we
use the MCBS data to estimate prediction equations for total medical
expenditure risk as well as its variance. (We describe our imputation
strategies in the next subsection.) These equations will use only covar-
iates that are also available in the HRS, so we can use the estimated
prediction equations from the MCBS data to impute the mean ( ) andˆEj
variance ( ) of health expenditures for each person in our HRSV̂arj
30 There is a sizable literature on empirical methods to deal with the incomplete data
by combining multiple data sets. For an excellent survey, see Ridder and Moffitt (2007).
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sample. With the imputed and , our augmented HRS data canˆ ̂E Varj j
now be represented as
ˆ ̂{M , H , D , X , E , Var } . (5)j j j j j j jIHRS
In the second step, we first regress Medigap coverage on expected ex-
penditure and pricing variables:
ˆM p d  d E  d D   , (6)j 0 1 j 2 j j
where, as before, the variables in include a third-order polynomialDj
in age, gender, and state of residence to capture the pricing of Medigap
insurance. As we report below, and consistent with our finding in Section
VI, we obtain a negative and significant estimate for d1, the coefficient
on expected expenditure, implying advantageous selection in the pur-
chase of Medigap in the HRS. We then gradually add potential sources
of advantageous selection from the list of variables contained in {X ,j
. We will show below that when we estimate the partial correlationV̂ar }j
between Medigap coverage and health expenditure risk, controlling not
only for the determinants of price, , but also for , the partial̂D {X , Var }j j j
correlation will turn positive. More precisely, when we estimate
ˆ ̂ ̂M p v  v E  v risktol  v Var # risktol  v Varj 0 1 j 2 j 3 j j 4 j
 v X  v D   , (7)5 j 6 j j
we find that is positive and significant—consistent with the positiveˆv1
correlation property predicted by standard insurance models with unidi-
mensional private information. This is the sense in which we say we
have successfully identified several key sources of advantageous
selection.
B. Imputation Strategies
Our empirical strategy requires a determination about which sample of
the MCBS to use in estimating the prediction equations. Conceptually,
we want a measure of expenditure risk for a person who has basic
Medicare and is considering whether to buy Medigap. To obtain such
a measure, it is not clear whether we should estimate prediction equa-
tions using only data for those without Medigap or whether we should
instead include the whole MCBS sample. We follow a practical strategy
and estimate the prediction equations both ways. We explain below that
biases induced by each method may be slight and are likely to understate
the extent of advantageous selection. Later we show that our results are
robust to which method we use.
Imputation using the MCBS subsample with no Medigap coverage.—With
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the first method, we use only the subsample in the MCBS with no
Medigap coverage to estimate the mean and variance of medical ex-
penditures. Suppose that the mean and variance prediction equations
obtained from the MCBS are
ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆE p a  a H  a D (8)i1 0 1 i 2 i
and
2 ˆ ˆ ˆˆV̂ar p (E  E ) p b  b H  b D . (9)i1 i i1 0 1 i 2 i
We can then impute the mean and variance of medical expenditures
for the HRS sample as follows: for each , the imputed meanj  IHRS
medical expenditure is
ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆE p a  a H  a D , (10)j1 0 1 j 2 j
and the imputed variance of medical expenditure is
ˆ ˆ ˆV̂ar p b  b H  b D . (11)j1 0 1 j 2 j
Imputation using the whole MCBS.—With the second method, we use
the whole MCBS sample. In this case, we include in the regressions a
Medigap status indicator . That is,Mi
ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆE p h  h M  h H  h D (12)i2 0 1 i 2 i 3 i
and
2 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆV̂ar p (E  E ) p y  y M  y H  y D . (13)i2 i i2 0 1 i 2 i 3 i
We then impute the mean and variance for each member ofj  IHRS
the HRS sample as follows:
ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆE p h  h H  h D (14)j2 0 2 j 3 j
and
ˆ ˆ ˆV̂ar p y  y H  y D . (15)j2 0 2 j 3 j
Note that in the imputation equations (14) and (15), we set equalMj
to zero for the HRS sample. Thus the predictions above pertain to the
mean and variance of medical expenditures for a person without Medi-
gap coverage.
Discussion of the imputation methods.—If, conditional on and , se-H Dj j
lection into Medigap were random, then either of the two approaches
outlined above would be conceptually correct. The list of observable
health variables that we include in our imputation is extremely detailed,
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so it may be that selection based on unobserved health is not quanti-
tatively important.31
If, however, there is nonrandom selection into Medigap conditional
on and , each imputation method will have limitations. ConsiderH Dj j
the first method. If those with Medigap have systematically better un-
observed health (just as they have better observed health), then willˆEj1
tend to overestimate the expected medical expenditure for those in
HRS who actually have Medigap. This bias will cause us to understate
the degree of advantageous selection in the HRS. Using the second
imputation method, we need to include the Medigap status indicator
in prediction equations (12) and (13). Otherwise we will exaggerateMi
the pre-Medigap purchase expenditure risk by including the “moral
hazard” or price effect of Medigap coverage. However, given the selec-
tion into Medigap, the Medigap coefficient will be biased. For example,
if those with Medigap have systematically better unobserved health
(just as they have better observed health), the Medigap coefficient will
be downward biased (i.e., we understate the price effect). This would
cause to, again, overstate the pre-Medigap expenditure risk for thoseˆEj2
who actually have Medigap.
C. Sources of Advantageous Selection: Main Findings
This subsection reports our main results regarding the sources of ad-
vantageous selection. Panels A and B in table 6 report, respectively,
results based on the two methods of imputing health expenditure risk
described above. In each panel, columns 1–3 report estimates of the
coefficient on predicted health expenditure (with the correspondingˆEj
p-values of the estimates in parentheses) in equations (6) and (7) for
samples of varying sizes.32 (The sample sizes change because of the
additional variables that we explain below.) We enter into the re-ˆEj
gressions in tens of thousands of dollars ($10,000) to make the results
easier to interpret. Columns 4–11 indicate the list of control variables
included in X, with Y (N) indicating that a particular variable is (is not)
included. Column 12 gives the sample size for the regression.
Here we explain the decline in the number of observations due to
31 The (unadjusted) is around .3 in the regressions for E and around .2 in the2R
regressions for Var. The relatively low ’s are not surprising because medical expenditures2R
are intrinsically highly random. Thus, low ’s do not mean that the model does a poor2R
job of predicting expected medical expenditures for a certain type of person. It should
also be noted that this does not reveal whether the random selection assumption is right
or wrong.
32 We adjusted the standard errors for the coefficient estimates of to account forˆEj
the fact that was estimated in the first step. Specifically, we calculated the varianceˆEj
of the first-step prediction errors, which is then multiplied by and added to the2ˆv1
estimated variance of the second-step regression residuals.
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missing values as we add more variables to the regressions.33 Two vari-
ables lead to substantial loss of observations: First, adding risk tolerance
to the regression eliminates about two-thirds of the sample because the
HRS asked these questions of only about one-third of the subsample.
Second, when we include the cognition variables (in particular, cogni-
tion questions related to numeracy), we lose another half of the sample.
In order to avoid the possibility that our results are driven by the chang-
ing samples, we rerun all our regressions on three samples. Column 1
reports results using the full sample, column 2 for the medium sample
(for which the risk tolerance measure is available), and column 3 for
the smallest sample (for which the cognition variables are also available).
Now we explain the key findings from table 6.
• Rows 1 and 9 show that, regardless of the imputation method, if we
do not control for any of the variables, individuals with higher healthX j
expenditure risk (measured by ) are less likely to purchase Medigap.ˆEj
For the sample with the most complete data, the point estimates imply
that a $10,000 increase in health expenditure risk reduces the proba-
bility of buying Medigap by 4.6–5.7 percentage points. This, of course,
is simply a confirmation (from a different angle and using different
data) of our finding of advantageous selection reported in Section VI.
• Rows 2 and 10 add risk tolerance alone to the regression (6). This
specification is important because the previous literature we have cited,
both theoretical and empirical, has focused almost exclusively on risk
aversion as the source of advantageous selection. When rows 2 and 10,
respectively, are compared with rows 1 and 9, the inclusion of risk tol-
erance only slightly reduces, if at all, the magnitude of the negative
coefficient on predicted health expenditures.34 However, risk tolerance,
as predicted by standard economic models, is a significant predictor of
Medigap purchase: when it is entered as a set of dummy variables, an
F-test rejects the null hypothesis of joint insignificance with a p-value of
less than .001; indeed more risk-tolerant individuals are less likely to
purchase Medigap. Importantly, more risk-tolerant individuals are not
especially unhealthy. Thus, in the language we used in Section III, what
we find here is that risk aversion (the opposite of risk tolerance) satisfies
property 1 but does not satisfy property 2, which is also necessary for
it to be a source of advantageous selection in the Medigap insurance
market.
• Results change, however, when we also control for the variance of
33 Most of the missing values result from the relevant survey questions not being asked
instead of nonresponse.
34 This result does not depend on the linear specification for the effect of risk tolerance.
If, instead, risk tolerance enters as a third-order polynomial or as a complete set of dummy
variables, the point estimate of the coefficient on is essentially unchanged from thatˆEj
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health expenditures. In rows 3 and 11 we report results from a regression
that includes risk tolerance, the predicted variance, and the interaction
between the two. The inclusion of these measures affects the coefficient
estimate on .35 In the medium samples, the estimated coefficient onˆEj
remains negative but is now statistically indistinguishable from zero.ˆEj
In the small samples, the coefficient on reverses its sign from negativeˆEj
to positive, though it is statistically indistinguishable from zero.
Notably, the estimated coefficient on the level of risk tolerance and
the interaction between variance and risk tolerance are bothV̂arj
negative. The latter is as we would expect. The probability of buying
insurance increases with greater risk aversion, and more so for a
person who faces a higher variance of expenditures. According to
our point estimates, at the mean level of in our sample, a one-V̂arj
standard-deviation increase in the risk tolerance measure decreases the
probability of purchasing Medigap by 6.7 percentage points. What is
puzzling, at least from the perspective of standard economic theory, is
that the coefficient on the variance term is negative. As the inter-V̂arj
action between variance and risk tolerance is also negative, this implies
that individuals with higher uncertainty in their medical expenditures
are less likely to purchase Medigap (with this negative effect being larger
for people who are more risk tolerant).
Remark 1. Strictly in terms of mechanics, the negative coefficient
we estimate for the variance term is not a surprise. To see this, noteV̂ar
that because the inclusion of in the regression reduces the mag-V̂ar
nitude of the negative coefficient on , is in some sense acting asˆ ̂E Var
a “source” of advantageous selection. Thus it must satisfy the two prop-
erties listed in Section III. Because increases with (i.e., those withˆV̂ar E
higher mean health expenditure also have high variance of health ex-
penditure), it has to be the case that reduces the probability ofV̂ar
purchasing Medigap in order for it to “act” as a source of advantageous
selection.
Remark 2. A possible explanation within the standard expected
utility theory for the negative coefficient estimate on , with meanV̂ar
expenditure held fixed, goes as follows: Consider a simple static modelˆE
in which consumers face a loss of L with probability p. Then a mean-
preserving spread implies reducing p while increasing L. Why might
someone with higher L (and lower p) demand less insurance? Under
the current U.S. institutional structure, Medicaid may cover catastrophic
losses, and emergency rooms are required to (and often do) treat the
uninsured. Thus the incentives for purchasing Medigap may be lower
35 The bulk of the change in the coefficient on is attributable to the inclusion of aˆEj
control for the variance in health expenditure. For example, in results not shown here,
adding just a control for variance in the smallest sample increases the coefficient on ˆEj
to .0370, with a p-value of .143.
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for those with higher L (and lower p) because large losses are more
likely to be eligible for public-funded health care.
Remark 3. Several conventional departures from the expected util-
ity theory postulated in the behavioral decision theory literature can
also explain the negative coefficient on variance. In such models, a
decrease in p, with pL held fixed, could in fact reduce demand for
insurance. For example, in the rank-dependent utility model (see, e.g.,
Quiggin 1982; Starmer 2000), the probability weights in expected utility
theory are replaced by probability weighting functions. Say these func-
tions down-weight low-probability events. Then, in a comparison of two
people with equal pL, but where one has a large probability of small
losses and the other has a very small probability of catastrophic losses,
the latter person may in fact demand less insurance (because he or she
chooses to engage in “wishful thinking” and largely ignore the small
chance of the catastrophic event).
Remark 4. Yet another possible behavioral explanation is that in-
dividuals may underestimate the variance of their health expenditures.
It is possible that, conditional on mean expenditures, those with higher
variances will have a larger downward bias in their prediction of variance,
reducing their demand for insurance.36
Remark 5. The above discussions have assumed that variance is a
fixed and exogenous trait of an individual. A final possibility is that it
is instead endogenous. For example, the technology of health invest-
ment may be such that the same behaviors that lead to poor health
cause both a higher mean and a higher variance in expenditures, as
well as leading people to purchase less insurance.
• As we include more variables from , reported respectively in rowsX j
4–8 and rows 12–16 for the two imputation methods, the coefficient on
eventually becomes positive and statistically significant at the 5–10ˆEj
percent level. A key result is in row 6, where the inclusion of cognitive
ability as a control variable causes the coefficient on predicted expen-
diture to turn to positive .0758 with a p-value of .049. The most complete
specification 8 implies that a $10,000 increase in predicted health ex-
penditure increases the probability of buying Medigap by 7.8 percentage
points. All the new variables we include shift the partial correlationX j
between health expenditure risk and Medigap coverage in a positive
direction.
Among all the variables in , cognition and income are distinctivelyX j
important in two senses: first, if only cognition or income is included
in , it substantially changes the estimated coefficient on ; and second,ˆX Ej j
when all variables in are included in the regression, both cognitionX j
36 Koufopoulos (2005) explores how overconfidence in risk perception might lead to
advantageous selection.
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and income stand out as significant predictors of Medigap purchase.
For example, adding the cognition variables alone changes the coef-
ficient on from .057 (p-value .12) to .012 (p-value .68); and in theˆEj
full regression that includes all elements of , a standard deviationX j
increase in just the TICS score is associated with a 5.4-percentage-point
increase in the probability of purchasing a Medigap policy.37
Similarly, adding income variables alone changes the coefficient on
from .057 (p-value .12) to .022 (p-value .45); and someone withˆEj
an annual income between $45,000 and $50,000 is 12 percentage points
more likely to purchase a Medigap policy than someone with an income
between $15,000 and $20,000. Thus, both cognition and income provide
some important part of the explanation for the otherwise negative cor-
relation between mean expenditure risk and insurance purchase.
In summary, these results indicate that sources of the advantageous
selection we documented in Section VI include a number of factors—
income, education, longevity expectations, and financial planning ho-
rizon—that would typically enter a rich economic model of insurance
purchase. In addition, however, we find evidence that factors typically
omitted from economic models, such as levels of cognitive ability and
financial numeracy, are also important sources of advantageous selec-
tion. (We will explore the pathways through which cognitive ability may
act as a source of advantageous selection below.) We find no evidence,
however, that risk preferences, which the theoretical literature has fo-
cused on and which are significant predictors of Medigap purchase, can
explain advantageous selection in this market. These findings are robust
to the methods we use to impute expected medical expenditure and its
variance.
Our study is, to the best of our knowledge, the first to provide direct
evidence on the sources of advantageous selection in health insurance
markets; it is also the first study to identify a set of variables that are
sufficient to explain away the negative correlation between ex post
health expenditure and Medigap coverage documented in Section VI
and obtain a positive partial correlation between health expenditure
risk and the level of insurance coverage.
Robustness.—In our working paper (Fang et al. 2006), we showed that
our findings regarding the sources of advantageous selection are robust
to different choices regarding whether those with employer-provided
health insurance are included, as well as alternative measures of health
expenditure risk (i.e., potential Medigap expenditure as described in
Sec. VI.C) and alternative measures of the degree of uncertainty in
37 For reasons of space, these results are not presented here but are available from the
authors on request.
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health expenditures (i.e., using the ratio of ninetieth and tenth per-
centiles in place of the variance).
D. Pathways for Cognitive Ability as a Source of Advantageous Selection
Our analysis points to cognitive ability as an important source of ad-
vantageous selection in the Medigap market. Because this factor is typ-
ically omitted from economic models, we consider here potential path-
ways through which cognitive ability may induce advantageous selection.
This subsection is exploratory. Further research is needed to quantify
the importance of the postulated pathways.
• A first potential pathway through which cognitive ability may act as
a source of advantageous selection is via its effect on individuals’ ability
to evaluate the costs and benefits of purchasing Medigap. This channel
is consistent, for example, with earlier literature showing that many
senior citizens have difficulty understanding Medicare and Medigap
rules; in particular, many fail to understand Medicare cost-sharing re-
quirements (see, e.g., Cafferata 1984; McCall, Rice, and Sangl 1986;
Davidson, Sofaer, and Gertler 1992; Harris and Keane 1998).38 The con-
ceptual framework in Section III clarifies how this channel might work.
Let (p, c) denote health risk and cognitive ability, respectively. Suppose
that there is a negative correlation between c and p; that is, individuals
with higher cognitive ability have lower health expenditure risk. Then
one particularly simple model of this channel would have a threshold
cognitive ability level below which individuals are simply unaware ofc*
Medigap and therefore do not buy. Alternatively, might represent thec*
cognitive ability level below which the costly effort required to determine
the optimal Medigap decision is too great. In this latter case, optimal
rules of thumb or other psychological forces may lead consumers more
often to choose the status quo of no Medigap.39 In either case, those
with will purchase Medigap if it is worthwhile, and presumablyc 1 c*
only those with high health expenditure risk, that is, , will choosep 1 p*
to purchase Medigap. As a result, the set of individuals who purchase
Medigap insurance is given by , and theQ p {(p, c) : c ≥ c*, p ≥ p*}Medigap
set of individuals who do not purchase Medigap is given by
. Because of the negativeQ p {(p, c) : c ! c*; or (c 1 c*, p ! p*)}No_Medigap
correlation in the population between c and p, such that p tends to be
38 There is also a literature showing that many consumers have difficulty understanding
health insurance plans more generally. See, e.g., Gibbs, Sangl, and Burrus (1996), Isaacs
(1996), Tumlinson et al. (1997), and Cunningham, Denk, and Sinclair (2001).
39 See, e.g., Iyengar and Lepper (2000), Iyengar and Jiang (2003), and Choi, Laibson,
and Madrian (forthcoming) for evidence of the effect of complexity on the likelihood of
choosing defaults and making “no choice.”
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TABLE 7
Do High-Cognition Individuals Pay Lower Medigap Premiums?































Observations 1,096 571 1,113 1,126 549 549
2R .11 .07 .11 .10 .08 .08
Note.—All regressions include controls for gender, state of residence, a third-order polynomial in age, and Medigap
plan letters. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
* Significant at 10 percent.
** Significant at 5 percent.
*** Significant at 1 percent.
larger for those with , it is possible that we observe advantageousc ! c*
selection if we do not condition on cognition c.
• A second potential channel through which cognitive ability may act
as a source of advantageous selection is via its effect on search costs.
Given the price dispersion in Medigap plans offered by different in-
surers, those with higher cognitive ability may be able to obtain lower
effective prices and thus be more likely to purchase Medigap. We ex-
amined two testable implications of this pathway. First, if this pathway
is important, Medigap premiums paid by individuals with higher cog-
nitive ability should tend to be lower than those paid by individuals with
lower cognitive ability. Second, the observed extent of advantageous
selection should be less pronounced in states with less Medigap price
dispersion. To test the first implication, we use a subset of individuals
in the HRS who both have nonmissing information about cognitive
ability and also report their Medigap premium. Table 7 provides the
results from simple regressions of the paid Medigap premium on the
four measures of cognitive ability we used in our earlier analysis, word
recall, numeracy, TICS score, and subtracting 7, first separately in col-
umns 1–4 and jointly in column 5. In column 6 we extract a cognitive
ability factor from the four measures. We also included income in the
regressions because earlier we also found income to be a source of
advantageous selection. Thus it is also interesting to see whether higher-
income individuals purchase Medigap with a higher probability because
of lower effective prices (due to lower search costs, say). The evidence
is rather weak: column 3 does show that individuals with high TICS
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TABLE 8
Comparisons of the Extent of Advantageous Selection between States with
Different Coefficients of Variation for Medigap Plan C Prices
States with Coefficient
of Variation below the
Median
States with Coefficient
of Variation above the
Median









Health controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 8,889 7,894 7,056 6,280
Note.—All regressions are of the same specifications as the corresponding ones in table 2. They are weighted by
the cross-section sample weights. The descriptions of the direct health controls can be found in the Data Appendix.
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level.
* Significant at 10 percent.
** Significant at 5 percent.
*** Significant at 1 percent.
scores pay slightly lower premiums, but this is significant only at the 10
percent level, and all the other coefficients are statistically insignificant.40
To test the second implication, we divide the states into two groups
according to whether the coefficient of variation of Medigap Plan C
(the most popular Medigap plan) in that state is below or above the
median coefficient of variation (which is equal to .17).41 We use the
MCBS data and rerun the regressions reported in table 2 separately for
the two groups of states. Table 8 shows the estimated Medigap coeffi-
cients with and without health controls for the two groups of states. The
magnitude of advantageous selection is little affected by the degree of
price dispersion in the Medigap market (and, indeed, it is slightly greater
in the states with a low coefficient of variation).
Taken together, the results in tables 7 and 8 suggest that the search
cost channel is not central to the relationship between cognitive ability
and advantageous selection. However, we view this evidence as prelim-
inary, and additional research on the relationship between cognition
and search costs is needed.
• A third potential channel through which cognitive ability may act
as a source of advantageous selection is via its effect on individuals’
information about health risks. High–cognitive ability individuals may
be healthier, but they may be more knowledgeable about potential
health risks. Specifically, consider two individuals with different cognitive
ability. The high–cognitive ability individual may have better health
status now, but he or she is aware of all the potential risks to health;
40 A one-standard-deviation increase in TICS score (1.3) leads to about a $78 lower
Medigap premium, which is less than 10 percent of the average premium for even the
cheapest Medigap Plan A.
41 The coefficients of variation for different Medigap plans by state come from app.
table 1 of Maestas et al. (2006), which used data from Weiss Ratings.
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the one with low cognitive ability thinks that there will be no more
health shocks beyond what he or she already experienced. The first
individual may be more likely to purchase Medigap than the second,
thus leading to advantageous selection.42
Understanding the pathways for cognitive ability and other variables
to act as sources of advantageous selection has important policy impli-
cations. If the first channel is important, it would suggest a role for
educational interventions to facilitate choice, or simplification of Medi-
gap rules to make the cost-benefit calculations simpler (see, e.g., Harris
2002); if the second channel is important, then pamphlets with detailed
price quotes (products that Weiss Ratings currently provides at a cost)
directly sent to Medicare recipients may increase Medigap enrollment;
if the third channel is important, it will call for yet a different kind of
information campaign, which is not about Medicare or Medigap, but
about various health risks the elderly may be facing.
V. Conclusion
In this paper we use data from the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey
to provide strong evidence of advantageous selection in Medigap in-
surance market. The first type of evidence comes from two sets of re-
gressions. In one set, we regress total medical expenditure on Medigap
status and control only for the determinants of price (gender, age, and
state of residence). We find that those with Medigap incur, on average,
about $4,000 less in total medical expenditure than those without Medi-
gap. In the second set of regressions, we regress total medical expen-
diture on the determinants of price along with a rich set of controls
for health status. Conditional on price and health, we find that those
with Medigap incur about $2,000 more in medical expenditure, on
average, than those without Medigap. These two sets of results can be
reconciled only if those with better health are more likely to purchase
supplemental coverage, that is, if there is “advantageous selection.”
These results are robust to different definitions of Medigap status and
to separating the sample into male and female subsamples. We find that
the magnitude of advantageous selection is larger for females than for
males.
We then propose a simple empirical strategy to combine MCBS and
HRS data and examine the sources of advantageous selection. Our find-
ings indicate that these sources include factors, such as income, edu-
cation, and planning horizons, that a rich economic model of insurance
42 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this potential pathway for cognitive
ability to act as a source of advantageous selection. Coelho and de Meza (2007) also argued
that individuals with different cognitive abilities may have different abilities to predict the
likelihood of illness, which will affect their insurance purchase.
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purchase would typically accommodate. Interestingly, we find no evi-
dence that variation in risk preferences, which is the primary focus of
the theoretical literature on advantageous selection, explains the oth-
erwise negative relationship between coverage and expenditure risk.
Those who are less risk tolerant buy more insurance, but they are not
particularly healthy.
In addition, we find that measures of cognitive ability and financial
numeracy, which standard economic models do not accommodate, are
important sources of advantageous selection; and we provide a prelim-
inary exploration of the pathways through which cognitive ability may
act as a source of advantageous selection. Our findings also suggest that
heterogeneity in risk distributions, not merely expected levels of ex-
penditure risk, should be included in models of asymmetric information.
Specifically, we found that differences in the variance of health expen-
diture, which standard models of insurance purchase ignore, are related
both to average expenditure risk and to insurance purchase. Our find-
ings are robust to changes in the sample and the method of imputing
expected medical expenditure.
Finally, while advantageous selection in an insurance market can can-
cel out the positive correlation between ex post risk and insurance cov-
erage that arises in classic adverse selection models such as Rothschild
and Stiglitz (1976), it is important to emphasize that this does not mean
there is no inefficiency in such a market. The policy implications of





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































sources of advantageous selection 347
References
Arrow, Kenneth. 1963. “Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medicare
Care.” A.E.R. 53 (December): 941–73.
Banthin, Jessica S., and Amy K. Taylor. 2001. “HMO Enrollment in the United
States: Estimates Based on Household Reports, 1996.” MEPS Research Find-
ings no. 15, Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Rockville, MD.
Barsky, Robert B., F. Thomas Juster, Miles Kimball, and Matthew D. Shapiro.
1997. “Preference Parameters and Behavioral Heterogeneity: An Experimental
Approach in the Health and Retirement Study.” Q.J.E. 112 (May): 537–79.
Cafferata, Gail L. 1984. “Knowledge of Their Health Insurance Coverage by the
Elderly.” Medical Care 22 (September): 835–47.
Cardon, James H., and Igal Hendel. 2001. “Asymmetric Information in Health
Insurance: Evidence from the National Medical Expenditure Survey.” Rand J.
Econ. 32 (Autumn): 408–27.
Cawley, John, and Tomas Philipson. 1999. “An Empirical Examination of Infor-
mation Barriers to Trade in Insurance.” A.E.R. 89 (September): 827–46.
Charles, Kerwin, and Erik Hurst. 2003. “The Correlation of Wealth across Gen-
erations.” J.P.E. 111 (December): 1155–82.
Chiappori, Pierre-Andre´. 2001. “Econometric Models of Insurance under Asym-
metric Information.” In Handbook of Insurance, edited by Georges Dionne.
Boston: Kluwer.
Chiappori, Pierre-Andre´, Bruno Jullien, Bernard Salanie´, and Francois Salanie´.
2006. “Asymmetric Information in Insurance: General Testable Implications.”
Rand J. Econ. 37 (Winter): 783–98.
Chiappori, Pierre-Andre´, and Bernard Salanie´. 2000. “Testing for Asymmetric
Information in Insurance Markets.” J.P.E. 108 (February): 56–78.
Choi, James J., David Laibson, and Brigitte C. Madrian. Forthcoming. “Reducing
the Complexity Costs of 401(k) Participation through Quick Enrollment.”
In Developments in the Economics of Aging, edited by David A. Wise. Chicago:
Univ. Chicago Press.
CMS (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services). 2005. Choosing a Medigap
Policy: A Guide to Health Insurance for People with Medicare. Baltimore: U.S. Dept.
Health and Human Services.
Coelho, Marta, and David de Meza. 2007. “Self Deception, Self Selection, Self
Destruction: Experimental Evidence against Adverse Selection.” Manuscript,
London School Econ.
Cohen, Alma. 2005. “Asymmetric Information and Learning: Evidence from the
Automobile Insurance Market.” Rev. Econ. Statis. 87 (June): 197–207.
Cohen, Alma, and Liran Einav. 2007. “Estimating Risk Preferences from De-
ductible Choice.” A.E.R. 97 (June): 745–88.
Cox, Donald F., and Christopher Hogan. 1997. “Biased Selection and Medicare
HMOs: Analysis of the 1989–1994 Experience.” Medical Care Res. and Rev. 54
(September): 259–85.
Cunningham, Peter J., Charles Denk, and Michael Sinclair. 2001. “Do Consumers
Know How Their Health Plan Works?” Health Affairs 20 (March/April): 159–
66.
Davidson, Bruce, Shoshanna Sofaer, and Paul Gertler. 1992. “Consumer Demand
and Biased Selection in the Demand for Coverage Supplementing Medicare.”
Soc. Sci. and Medicine 34 (9): 1023–34
de Meza, David, and David C. Webb. 2001. “Advantageous Selection in Insurance
Markets.” Rand J. Econ. 32 (Summer): 249–62.
Desmond, Katherine A., Thomas Rice, and Peter D. Fox. 2006. “Does Greater
348 journal of political economy
Medicare HMO Enrollment Cause Adverse Selection into Medigap?” Health
Econ., Policy and Law 1 (1): 3–21.
Dionne, Georges, Christian Gourie´roux, and Charles Vanasse. 2001. “Testing for
Evidence of Adverse Selection in the Automobile Insurance Market: A Com-
ment.” J.P.E. 109 (April): 444–53.
Ettner, Susan L. 1997. “Adverse Selection and the Purchase of Medigap Insurance
by the Elderly.” J. Health Econ. 16 (October): 543–62.
Fang, Hanming, Michael P. Keane, and Dan Silverman. 2006. “Sources of Ad-
vantageous Selection: Evidence from the Medigap Insurance Market.” Work-
ing Paper no. 12289 (June), NBER, Cambridge, MA.
Finkelstein, Amy, and Kathleen McGarry. 2006. “Multiple Dimensions of Private
Information: Evidence from the Long-Term Care Insurance Market.” A.E.R.
96 (September): 938–58.
Finkelstein, Amy, and James Poterba. 2004. “Adverse Selection in Insurance
Markets: Policyholder Evidence from the U.K. Annuity Market.” J.P.E. 112
(February): 183–208.
———. 2006. “Testing for Adverse Selection with ‘Unused Observables.’” Man-
uscript, Dept. Econ., Massachusetts Inst. Tech.
Gibbs, Deborah A., Judith A. Sangl, and Barri Burrus. 1996. “Consumer Per-
spectives on Information Needs for Health Plan Choice.” Health Care Financing
Rev. 18 (Fall): 55–73.
Harris, Katherine M. 2002. “Can High Quality Overcome Consumer Resistance
to Restricted Provider Access? Evidence from a Health Plan Choice Experi-
ment.” Health Services Res. 37 (June): 551–71.
Harris, Katherine M., and Michael P. Keane. 1998. “A Model of Health Plan
Choice: Inferring Preferences and Perceptions from a Combination of Re-
vealed Preference and Attitudinal Data.” J. Econometrics 89 (November): 131–
57.
Hemenway, David. 1990. “Propitious Selection.” Q.J.E. 105 (November): 1063–
69.
Hurd, Michael D., and Kathleen McGarry. 1997. “Medical Insurance and the
Use of Health Care Services by the Elderly.” J. Health Econ. 16 (April): 129–
54.
Isaacs, Stephen L. 1996. “Consumers’ Information Needs: Results of a National
Survey.” Health Affairs 15 (Winter): 31–41.
Iyengar, Sheena S., and Wei Jiang. 2003. “Choosing Not to Choose: The Effect
of More Choices on Retirement Savings Decisions.” Manuscript, Columbia
Univ.
Iyengar, Sheena S., and Mark Lepper. 2000. “When Choice Is Demotivating: Can
One Desire Too Much of a Good Thing?” J. Personality and Soc. Psychology 79
(December): 995–1006.
Jullien, Bruno, Benard Salanie´, and Francois Salanie´. 2007. “Screening Risk
Averse Agents under Moral Hazard.” Econ. Theory 30 (January): 151–69.
Kaiser Family Foundation. 2005. Medicare Chart Book. Washington, DC: Kaiser
Family Found.
Kan, Kamhon. 2003. “Residential Mobility and Job Changes under Uncertainty.”
J. Urban Econ. 54 (November): 566–86.
Keane, Michael P. 2004. “Modeling Health Insurance Choice Using the Het-
erogeneous Logit Model.” Manuscript, Yale Univ.
Kezdi, G., and R. J. Willis. 2005. “Who Becomes a Stockholder? Expectations,
Subjective Uncertainty, and Asset Allocation.” Manuscript, Univ. Michigan.
Khandker, Rezaul K., and Lauren A. McCormack. 1996. Enrollment and Utilization
sources of advantageous selection 349
across Medicare Supplemental Plans. Report submitted to the Health Care Fi-
nancing Admin. Washington, DC: Center Health Econ. Res.
———. 1999. “Medicare Spending by Beneficiaries with Various Types of Sup-
plemental Insurance.” Medical Care Res. and Rev. 56 (June): 137–55.
Khwaja, Ahmed. 2005. “The Dynamic Trade-off between Medical Expenditure
Insurance, Moral Hazard and Mortality Risk: A Life Cycle Analysis of the Effects
of Medicare on Individual Health Incentives and Health Outcomes.” Manu-
script, Fuqua School Bus., Duke Univ.
Kimball, Miles S., Claudia R. Sahm, and Matthew D. Shapiro. Forthcoming.
“Using Survey-Based Risk Tolerance.” J. American Statis. Assoc.
Koufopoulos, Kostas. 2005. “Asymmetric Information, Heterogeneity in Risk Per-
ceptions and Insurance: An Explanation of a Puzzle.” Manuscript, London
School Econ.
Lewin Group. 2001. “Restricting Underwriting and Premium Rating Practices
in the Medigap Market: The Experience of Three States.” Report no. 2001-
01. Washington, DC: AARP, Public Policy Inst.
Lillard, Lee A., and Jeannette Rogowski. 1995. “Does Supplemental Private In-
surance Increase Medicare Costs?” Working Paper no. 95-16, Rand Corp.,
Santa Monica, CA.
Lusardi, Annamaria. 1998. “On the Importance of the Precautionary Saving
Motive.” A.E.R. Papers and Proc. 88 (May): 449–54.
Maestas, Nicole, Mathis Schroeder, and Dana Goldman. 2006. “Price Variation
in Markets with Homogeneous Goods: The Case of Medigap.” Working Paper
no. 504, Rand Corp., Santa Monica, CA.
McCall, Nelda, Thomas Rice, and Judith Sangl. 1986. “Consumer Knowledge of
Medicare and Supplemental Health Insurance Benefits.” Health Services Res.
20 (February): 633–57.
Pauly, Mark V. 1974. “Overinsurance and Public Provision of Insurance: The
Roles of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection.” Q.J.E. 88 (February): 44–62.
Puelz, Robert, and Arthur Snow. 1994. “Evidence on Adverse Selection: Equi-
librium Signaling and Cross-Subsidization in the Insurance Market.” J.P.E. 102
(April): 236–57.
Quiggin, John. 1982. “A Theory of Anticipated Utility.” J. Econ. Behavior and
Organization 3 (December): 323–43.
Ridder, Geert, and Robert Moffitt. 2007. “The Econometrics of Data Combi-
nation.” In Handbook of Econometrics, vol. 6A, edited by James J. Heckman and
Edward E. Leamer. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Robst, John. 2006. “Estimation of a Hedonic Pricing Model for Medigap Insur-
ance.” Health Res. and Educational Trust 41 (December): 2097–2113.
Rothschild, Michael, and Joseph E. Stiglitz. 1976. “Equilibrium in Competitive
Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information.”
Q.J.E. 90 (November): 629–49.
Schmidt, Lucie. Forthcoming. “Risk Preferences and the Timing of Marriage
and Childbearing.” Demography.
Starmer, Chris. 2000. “Developments in Non–Expected Utility Theory: The Hunt
for a Descriptive Theory of Choice under Risk.” J. Econ. Literature 38 (June):
332–82.
Tumlinson, Anne, Hannah Bottigheimer, Peter Mahoney, Elliot Stone, and Ann
Hendricks. 1997. “Choosing a Health Plan: What Information Will Consumers
Use?” Health Affairs 16 (May/June): 229–38.
Wilson, Charles. 1977. “A Model of Insurance Markets with Incomplete Infor-
mation.” J. Econ. Theory 16 (December): 167–207.
350 journal of political economy
Wolfe, John R., and John H. Goddeeris. 1991. “Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard
and Wealth Effects in the Medigap Insurance Market.” J. Health Econ. 10 (4):
433–59.
